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COMMENT
TAX LAW-AvAILABILITY OF THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT TO
NONCORPORATE LESSORS UNDER THE SHORT-TERM LEASE TEST OF
I.R.C. § 46(e)(3)(B) AFTER McNamara v. Commissioner and Connor v.
Commissioner
INTRODUCTION
The Investment Tax Credit (ITC) is a credit against tax liability
which Congress allows to businesses as an incentive for their purchase
of qualified property (Section 38 property). t President Kennedy pro
posed the ITC in 1961 as a measure designed to stimulate the national
economy. In response, Congress enacted the ITC the following year
and since that time has reacted to swings in the economy by repeal or
reenactment of the ITC.2 In theory, the ITC is an incentive to pro
mote business investment in machinery and equipment. Such invest
ment results in modernization and expansion of plant and equipment
which is linked to increased employment and higher per capita in
come. 3 Thus, to stimulate the national economy effectively as in
tended by President Kennedy and the Congress, it is necessary that
the credit be applied to actual investments in business property.4
Lessors are generally allowed to take an ITC for Section 38 prop
ertyS purchased for lease in their businesses. In 1971, however, Con
gress enacted I.R.e. Section 46(e)(3) which specifically restricts the
1. I.R.C. § 38 (1988) creates the Investment Tax Credit (lTC), and I.R.C. §§ 46-49
(1988) govern the mechanics of its application. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying
text. See infra note 5 presenting the text of I.R.C. § 38 (1988).
2. See infra note 20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of legisla
tive repeal and reinstatement of the ITC. Congress has also reacted to swings in the econ
omy by changing the amount of the allowable ITC. See infra note 21 and accompanying
text.
3. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the economic
effects of the ITC.
4. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
5. In pertinent part, I.R.C. § 38 (1988) provides for a "General Business Credit" as
follows:
(a) Allowance of credit.-There shall be allowed as a credit against the tax im
posed by this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to the sum of
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ability of non-corporate lessors of Section 38 property to qualify for
the ITC. 6 Enactment of Section 46(e)(3) addressed congressional con
cern that partnerships or other non-corporate investors could use the
ITC to shelter from tax income that is unrelated to the investment.
Ideally, the ITC exceeds the tax liability derived from the partnership.
The taxpayer is then able to apply the excess ITC against the tax liabil
ity that is incurred on income from other sources. 7 Congress per
ceived shelter of unrelated income as undesirable because it subverts
the goal of the ITC which is to encourage genuine investment in busi
ness property to stimulate the economy. This shelter is a tax loop hole
that Congress closed by enacting Sections 46(e)(3)(A) and (B) to es
tablish criteria for ITC eligibility by non-corporate lessors.
To qualify for an lTC, a lessor-taxpayer must meet the restric
tions of either part (A) or part (B). Part (A) provides that the lessor
either manufacture or produce the leased property.8 Part (B) provides
(1) the business credit carryforwards carried to such taxable year,
(2) the amount of the current business year credit, plus
(3) the business credit carrybacks carried to such taxable year.
(b) Current year business credit.-For purposes of this subpart, the amount of
the current year business credit is the sum of the following credits determined for the
taxable year:
(1) the investment credit determined under section 46(a),
(2) the targeted jobs credit ... ,
(3) the alcohol fuels credit ... ,
(4) the research credit ... , plus
(5) the low-income housing credit ....
Id.

6. See infra note 29 for the full text of the statute. In pertinent part, I.R.C. § 46(e)(3)
provides that the ITC is denied unless:
(A) the lessor manufactured or produced the leased property or
(B) [1] the term of the lease (taking into account options to renew) is less than 50
percent of the useful life of the property, and
[2] for ... the first 12 months after the date on which the property is transferred
to the lessee the sum of the [allowable] deductions with respect to such property ...
exceeds 15 percent of the rental income produced by such property [15 percent test].
I.R.C. § 46(e)(3) (1988).
7. The partnership form of ownership avoids double taxation that applies to the cor
porate form of ownership. Partnership income is earned by the partnership and passes
directly to the partners subject only to tax as their personal earnings or income. R. CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW 15-16 n.39 (1986). Thus, the ITC flows directly through to the partner
as a credit to his personal income. "[T]he federal income tax is assessed against the profits
of the individual partners. There is no separate partnership income tax, although there is a
separate corporation income tax." Id.
Under the corporate form of ownership, the entity is taxed on the income that it pro
duces. That income is then taxed once again when it is disbursed as dividends to the share
holders. Id. at 27-28 n.5.
8. See. e.g., Carlson v. Commissioner, 712 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1983) (taxpayer's sub
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a two-pronged test to determine eligibility.9 Both parts of the two
pronged test must be met in order for the ITC to be available to a non
corporate lessor of Section 38 property. The first prong requires that
the lessor lease the property for less than half its useful life. The sec
ond prong requires the lessor's allowable business deductions related
to the lease to exceed fifteen percent of the income generated by the
lease.lO This comment focuses exclusively on the first prong of the
part (B) test. This test requires the lease to be for less than half the
useful life 11 of the property.
Although the short-term lease test appears unambiguous, the In
ternal Revenue Service (IRS), depending upon the facts of a case, has
successfully argued varied interpretations designed to disallow the
ITC. 12 The courts have generally given deference to the interpreta
tions of the IRS and disallowed the credit. In particular, disallowance
of the ITC has occurred where the lessor and lessee are commonly
controlled entities. Section I of this comment traces the background
of the ITC and the related noncorporate lessor provision. In section
II, two factually similar cases are presented discussing proffer by the
IRS of a realistic contemplation test in response to the taxpayer's ar
gument that the terms of the lease document should be respected. The
realistic contemplation test provides that lease documents, although
complying with the short-term lease test on their face, should be disre
garded if the parties realistically contemplated, at the inception of the
lease, that the leasing arrangement be continued indefinitely. 13
Although the test purports to look retrospectively to the time that the
lease was made, the IRS proves its case by presenting evidence that the
lease actually continued beyond the short-term period. 14
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First and Seventh
contracting of assembly of apple bins, the leased Section 38 property, not sufficient control
over processing to be considered manufacture under this section).
9. See supra note 6.
10. See, e.g., Freesen v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1986); Seligman v.
Commissioner, 796 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1986); Nelson v. Commissioner, 793 F.2d 179 (8th
Cir. 1986) (cases discussing the 15 percent test).
11. For the purposes of 1.R.c. § 46(e)(3), usefullife is defined as "the present class
life for such property (as defined in Section 168(g)(2»." ld. See infra note 29 for full text
of the statute.
12. The ITC or any tax credit reduces the taxpayer's tax liability for a given year. S.
SURREY, P. McDANIEL, H. AULT & S. KOPPELMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION,
CASES AND MATERIALS 505 (1986) [hereinafter S. SURREY]. Disallowing a tax credit re
stores the tax due to its pre-credit amount. In addition, the taxpayer may owe interest and
penalties on any deficiency. ld. at 31-33.
13. Connor v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988).
14. ld. at 989.
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Circuits have disagreed on the proper interpretation of the short-term
lease test. IS The First Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with the realis
tic contemplation test of the IRS and denies the ITC. 16 In contrast,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals gives credence to the terms
stated within the lease if the court determines that the lessor retains
the economic risk in the transaction. The lessor is then assumed to
.have made a genuine business investmentP
Section III of this comment examines two issues raised by the
IRS's arguments and the courts' interpretations of the short-term lease
test. First, statutory language and the varied interpretations are ex
plored, induding the IRS attack on qualification for the ITC by re
lated party owners of lessor and lessee. Second, this section discusses
the legitimacy of the recognition by the courts of administrative defer
ence to the IRS in light of the varied tests proposed by the IRS to
disallow the ITC.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE ITC AND RESTRICTED A V AILABILITY
TO NON-CORPORATE LESSORS
The ITC was first proposed by President Kennedy in 196}l8 and

15. See McNamara v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1987).
16. Connor, 847 F.2d at 989. In two related decisions following those in Connor and
McNamara, the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals applied the Connor court's
realistic contemplation test and distinguished McNamara on its facts. See Owen v. Com
missioner, 881 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1989); McEachron v. Commissioner, 873 F.2d 176 (8th
Cir. 1988) (Owen and McEachron each challenged disallowance of the ITC on the same
facts in different circuits of the courts of appeals).
The realistic contemplation test has also been called the reasonable contemplation or
reasonable certainty test. The majority of the Tax Court decisions follow the realistic con
templation test applied in Connor v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988). See, e.g.,
Sanders v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1215 (1984); Peterson v. Commissioner, 44
T.e.M. (CCH) 674 (1982); Ridder v. Commissioner, 76 T.e. 867 (1981).
17. McNamara v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir. 1987).
18. PresideIit Kennedy commented in' his 1961 President's Recommendations On
Tax Revision:
Today, as we face serious pressure on our balance of payments position, we must
give special attention to the modernization of our plant and equipment .... At the
same time, to meet the needs of a growing population and labor force, and to
achieve a rising per capita income and employment level, we need a high and
rising level of both private and public capital formation .... I am now proposing
additional incentives for the modernization and expansion of private plant and
equipment. . . . [W]e should ... now [implement the ITC] to strengthen our
antirecession program, stimulate employment, and increase our export mar
kets.... Specifically, therefore, I recommend enactment of an investment tax
incentive in the form of a tax credit ... [to] be taken as an offset against the firm's
tax liability . . ..
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE,

87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1961).

1990]

SHORT-TERM LEASE TEST OF lR.C SECTION 46(e)(3)(B)

79

enacted in 1962 as a means to stimulate the economy. 19 However, the
ITC has had a rather checkered history since its enactment. 20 Its re
peal or reinstatement has depended upon the state of the economy.21
The congressional objective in using the ITC is stimulation of capital
investment in order to infuse new life into the economy when it ap
pears to be stagnant or stalled. 22
The ITC is available to businesses for investment in qualified
property, and the effect of the ITC is reduction of tax liability.23 The
credit is mandatory and must be taken in the year the property is put
in service in order to arrive at the proper tax liability for that year. 24
The property must be business property acquired for a profit motive
and the taxpayer must have a depreciable interest in the property.25
The amount of the credit taken in one year cannot exceed the tax
19. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 3297, 3304.
20. [d. (ITC first enacted in 1962). S. REP. No. 1724, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, re
printed in 1966 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4327, 4328 (repealed in 1966 to com
bat inflation). S. REP. No. 79, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. I, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 1198 (reinstated in 1967 when inflationary forces abated). H.R. REP.
No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. I, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS
1645 (repealed in 1969 as part of an overall plan to ensure tax equity). H.R. REP. No. 533,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1825, 1829
(reinstated in 1971, then termed "Job Development Investment Credit," "to bolster the
economy and create additional jobs by encouraging expenditures on machinery and equip
ment which have been sagging badly"). [d. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10,
reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. at 170 (Congressional concern with equity in the tax system where
taxpayers have used the credit "to reduce their tax liability to very low percentages of their
taxable income"). Id.
21. President Kennedy commented in his 1961 President's Recommendations On
Tax Revision:
I believe this investment tax credit will become a useful and continuous part of
our tax structure. But it will be a new venture and remain in need of review.
Moreover, it may prove desirable for the Congress to modify the credit from time
to time so as to adapt it to the needs of a changing economy.
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961).
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3297, 3304 (established the ITC at 7 percent); S. REP. No. 36,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 54, 57 (in
creased the ITC to 10 percent).
22. See supra note 18.
23. A tax deduction reduces the amount of taxable income to which the tax rate is
applied. Alternatively, a credit reduces the tax owed airectly, on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
Thus, a credit is of greater tax savings benefit. S. SURREY, supra note 12, at 505.
24. Rev. Rul. 64-138, 1964-1 c.B. 509-10.
25. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 3304, 3318-19; H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29, reprinted in
1971 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1825, 1843-44.
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payer's tax liability.26 The amount of any unused credit is carried
either forward or backward to the appropriate tax years. 27
At present, the ITC is generally repealed,28 but I.R.C. Section
46(e)(3)29 remains valid law and currently applies to property ex
26. The taxpayer first computes his tax, then computes the ITC which is taken as a
credit to reduce the tax for which the taxpayer is liable. Credits reduce tax liability on a
dollar-for-dollar basis. See supra note 23. See also PRENTICE HALL INFORMATION SERV
ICES, 1989 FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK ~~ 1105,2050 (1989).
The total ITC for the current year is reported on line 8 of Form 3468 titled: Computa
tion of Investment Credit. If the taxpayer has ITCs only for 1988, he completes Form 3468
and enters the appropriate amount from Form 3468 on line 44 of Form 1040. 2 INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, PACKAGE X, INFORMATIONAL COPIES OF FEDERAL TAX FORMS
191-95 (1988) [hereinafter VOL. 2 OF PACKAGE X]. Form 1040 is titled: U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return 1988. I INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PACKAGE X, INFORMA
TIONAL COPIES OF FEDERAL TAX FORMS 19 (1988) [hereinafter VOL. I OF PACKAGE X].
If, in addition to an lTC, the taxpayer has "a 1988 jobs credit ... , credit for alcohol
used as fuel ... , research credit ... , low-income housing credit ... [or] carryback or
carryforward of any general business credit," the taxpayer stops at line 8 of Form 3468 and
must then complete Form 3800 titled: General Business Credit. VOL. 2 OF PACKAGE X at
191. See also supra note 5. The amount from line 8 of Form 3468 is entered on line I of
Form 3800. The total amount of the General Business Credit available to the taxpayer is
computed on Form 3800 and the appropriate amount entered on line 44 of Form 1040. Id.
at 197-200. See also VOL. I OF PACKAGE X 19-20,38 (1988) (illustrating Form 1040 and
explaining the procedure for completion of line 44 of Form 1040).
27. "Unused credits for a taxable year can be carried back to each of the three pre
ceding taxable years and then carried forward to each of the IS following taxable years."
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. II-50, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4138.
28. In 1986, I.R.C. § 49 was enacted, repealing the ITC for most property placed in
service after December 31, 1985. I.R.C. § 49 provides:
§ 49. Termination of regular percentage
(a) General Rule.-For purposes of determining the amount of the invest
ment tax credit ... the regular percentage shall not apply to any property placed
in service after December 31, 1985.
(b) Exceptions.-Subject to the provisions of subsections (c) [35-Percent re
duction in credit for taxable years after 1986] and (d) [Full basis adjustment],
subsection (a) shall not apply to the following:
(I) Transition property [defined in section (e)] ...
(2) Qualified progress expenditure for periods before January I,
1986....
(3) Qualified timber property ....
I.R.C. § 49 (1988).
In addition, ITC carryovers for 1985 and preceding years are allowed. I.R.C. § 39 (1988).
Since the credit is non-refundable and may exceed the tax payable for the year in question,
Congress has allowed excess amounts of the ITC to be carried forward or backward to
other years. See supra note 27.
29. 1.R.c. § 46(e)(3) states:
(3) Noncorporate lessors. A credit shall be allowed by section 38 [26
U.S.C.S. § 38] to a person which is not a corporation with respect to property of
which such person is the lessor only if
(A) the property subject to the lease has been manufactured or produced by
the lessor, or
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cepted from the general repeapo and to resolution of litigation of ITCs
taken prior to 1986. In addition, because Congress has a lengthy his
tory of repeal and reinstatement of the lTC, it is conceivable that the
ITC will take on a larger or different life at a future date. 3l
Congress enacted the noncorporate lessor provision 32 restrictions
to the ITC in 1971 to close a tax loophole which allowed passive inves
tors to create leasing partnerships in order to shelter from tax, income
unrelated to the ITC transaction. 33 Income is sheltered from tax lia
bility through leasing partnerships because partnership income is not
taxed to the partnership, but rather, to each partner as an individual. 34
Thus, each partner would own a share of the income generated from
the partnership as well as a share of the ITC. For example, a partner
ship of doctors could purchase and lease Section 38 property. The
ITC would reduce tax liability for income from the partnership as well
as from their medical practices. 35
(B) the term of the lease (taking into account options to renew) is less than
50 percent of the useful life of the property, and for the period consisting of
the first 12 months after the date on which the property is transferred to the
lessee the sum of the deductions with respect to such property which are
allowable to the lessor solely by reason of section 162 [26 U.S.C.S. § 162]
other than rents and reimbursed amounts with respect to such property) ex
ceeds 15 percent of the rental income produced by such property.
In the case of property of which a partnership is a lessor, the credit otherwise
allowable under section 38 [26 U.S.C.S. § 38] with respect to such property to any
partner which is a corporation shall be allowed notwithstanding the first sentence
of this paragraph. For purposes of this paragraph, an S corporation shall be
treated as a person which is not a corporation. This paragraph shall not apply
with respect to any property which is treated as section 38 [26 U.S.C.S. § 38]
property by reason of section 48(a)(I)(E) [26 U.S.C.S. § 48 (a)(I)(E)]. For pur
poses of subparagraph (B), in the case of any recovery property (within the mean
ing of section 168 [26.U.S.C.S. § 168]), the useful life shall be the present class life
for such property (as defined in section 168(g)(2) [26 U.S.C.S. § 168(g)(2)].
1.R.c. § 46(e)(3)(B) (1988).
30. See supra note 28.
31. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
32. I.R.C. § 46(e)(3) (1988).
33. Congress intended that the ITC be limited to real investment and that there be a
real business motive for a lease. H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29, reprinted
in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1825, 1843-44.
[M]aking the credit available to the lessor is desirable, as a general rule. . . .
Nevertheless, ... [the committee] is concerned about the extent to which individ
uals (singly or as a group in a joint venture) are able to utilize the tax benefits of
leasing transactions ... as a means to shelter from tax a substantial part of their
other income.
[d.
34. See supra note 7 comparing the effect of corporate and partnership ownership of
a company.
35. Connor v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 985, 987 (1st Cir. 1988).
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To ensure that those legitimate business lessors not falling within
the test would not be fully denied the benefit of the lTC, Congress
provided that the lessor may elect to pass the ITC through to the
lessee. "Even though an individual lessor ... is denied the credit, he
may still elect to pass it through to the lessee. In this manner the
credit is not denied to the acquisition itself, but simply to the lessor."36
This means that the lessor, denied the credit, can take pass-through of
the credit into account when forming the lease. The credit is, in effect,
sold along with the lease, and a lessee will theoretically pay a larger
rental for lease of equipment that comes with an ITC.
The following section explores the Commissioner's and taxpayers'
arguments and the treatment provided the short-term lease test in the
courts of appeals. Two courts of appeals' decisions 37 are presented to
show the conflict as to the interpretation of the short-term lease test.
The issue is whether, in factually similar circumstances, the lease doc
ument should be respected rather than application of sUbjective tests
that cause the lease to be disregarded. 38
36.

H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3D, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo

& ADMIN. NEWS 1825, 1845. See also I.R.C. § 48(d) (1988).

37. Connor v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988); McNamara v. Commis
sioner, 827 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1987).
38. There is substantial precedent for disregarding the form of the lease in favor of
the substance of the transaction. See Highland Hills Swimming Club, Inc. v. Wiseman, 272
F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1959). In accord, G. W. Van Keppel CO. V. Commissioner, 295 F.2d
767 (8th Cir. 1961); Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.e. 640 (1975).
In Highland Hills, the partnership taxpayer built a swimming pool and leased it to a related
corporation which owned and managed an adjacent health club. The major issue in this
case was whether stated terms in leases should be controlling for tax purposes when deter
mining the depreciable life of the swimming pool. Highland Hills, 272 F.2d at 179. The
court stated: "[I]n determining the character of any transaction or arrangement for tax
purposes the substance rather than the form is controlling..... That leases or terms of
leases may be disregarded under this principle is clear." Id. at 180. The court held that the
lease was, in substance, of indefinite duration. Id.
The result of this ruling was that the taxpayer's attempt to depreciate the property
over the term of the lease was disallowed. "If the stated period of the lease is not recog
nized and the lease is found to be of indefinite duration the improvement must be depreci
ated over its useful life. " Id. at 179. Thus, the court required that the pool's cost of nearly
$54,000 be amortized over its 20-year useful life rather than over the 100 month (8.33 year)
term of the lease. Id. at 180.
In Highland Hills the court considered four factors of particular importance in deter
mining the lease to be of indefinite duration: "the relationship of the parties concerned;
failure of the taxpayer to pay all of the rental; the fact that the swimming pool was an
integral part of the club; and the cost of the improvements made by the taxpayer." Id. at
179. Of these, the court perceived the relationship of the parties to the transaction or their
common control as the major factor in assessing whether to ignore the stated term of the
lease:
[T]he fact· that the stockholders of the corporations involved are identical or re
lated makes possible the continuation of the present lease arrangement as long as
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INTERPRETING THE SHORT-TERM LEASE TEST

Despite the criteria that the short-term lease test provides for ITC
qualification for noncorporate lessors, the proper interpretation of the
short-term lease test is unresolved. The statute provides in part that
"the term of the lease (taking into account options to renew) ... [must
be] less than 50 percent of the useful life of the property."39 The Com
missioner and taxpayers take different positions as to what this lan
guage means. In this dispute, the Commissioner contends that the
substance of the leasing transaction is actually a lease of indefinite du
ration. He argues that, despite the written terms of the lease, the par
ties realistically contemplated that the lease would last beyond half of
the property's useful life when the lease was made and such a transac
tion does not qualify for the ITC within the terms of the statute. 4O
The taxpayers, by contrast, argue that because legitimate business pur
poses support creation of a separate entity to serve as lessor to that
entity's related companies and because obtaining a better tax result is
not the primary motive behind formulation of the leasing transaction,
the terms of their written leases, which comply with the short-term
lease test, should be respected. 41 The approaches taken by the Seventh
and First Circuits to resolve this controversy over the interpretation of
the short-term lease test differ radically, but illustrate the competing
issues and concerns of the parties and of the courts.
A.

McNamara v. Commissioner4 2

In McNamara, the non-corporate lessor claimed the ITC on its
individual returns for the years 1977, 1978, and 1979 on the assump
tion that they were in compliance with the conditions of I.R.C. Section
46(e)(3)(B).43 The taxpayers formed a partnership, D & B Associates
(D & B), in 1968,44 for the dual purpose of meeting their equipment
needs without increasing liabilities and of diversifying their assets to
better cope with the economic swings which affect the construction
it is advantageous .... [This] has been borne out in practice.... And the continu
ance as long as it is advantageous is, of course, characteristic of an indefinite lease.
Id. at 180.
39. I.R.C. § 46(e)(3)(B) (1988). See supra note 29 for the full text of the statute.
40. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 169-70; Connor, 847 F.2d at 989.
41. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172; Connor, 847 F.2d at 987.
42. 827 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1987).
43. Id. at 169.
44. Donald G. McNamara and Robert F. Christiansen each owned a one-half inter
est in the partnership. Both McNamara and Christiansen challenged disallowance of the
ITC by the IRS. Amounts at issue are as follows:
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business. 45 D & B purchased the Section 38 property, took advantage
of the lTC, and leased the property toa related corporation, F.J.A.
Christiansen Roofing Co., Inc. (Roofing).46 The leases were for a fixed
term, less than half the useful life of the property, and contained no
option to renew. In addition, the parties renegotiated the leases47 for
successive periods at different terms.48
McNamara,
Christiansen,
1977 $2,804.00
$2,804.00
1978
7,307.00
7,307.00
1979
6,300.00
6,811.00
McNamara v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1464 (1986).
45. F.J.A. Christiansen:
had a low net worth and limited working capital and was reluctant to incur addi
tional indebtedness because the existence of excessive liabilities on its balance
sheet would severely impede its ability to obtain bid bonds necessary to bid on
construction projects. . . .
[T]he taxpayers were also motivated by a desire to acquire some assets which
would be insulated from the risks and seasonal swings of the construction busi
ness.... [I]n addition ... D & B owns real estate which it leases to another
related company and has invested in stock and in partnerships involved in oil and
gas activities.
McNamara, 827 F.2d at 169.
46. Stock ownership of F.J.A. Christiansen Roofing Co., Inc. was as follows:
Nonvoting
Votirig Class A Class B ComStockholder
Common Stock
mon Stock
Preferred Stock
Donald McNamara
Robert F. Christiansen
Christiansen Family Trust
Joyce Church

50 %
33.8%
16.2%

o

39%
5%
56%
0

0
0
0
100%

Totals
100 %
100%
100%
McNamara, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1465. Thus 83.8% of the voting stock in the corporation
(a controlling amount) is owned by Donald McNamara and Robert F. Christiansen, the
partners of D & B Associates. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 169.
47. See McNamara, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1465-67 for details of the lease provisions.
Section 38 property at issue included:
equipment
year of
acquisition
useful life
Mack Truck
1977
8 years
Toshiba Copier
8 years
1977
Mack Truck
1978
5 years
35-ton P & H
1979
10 years
hydraulic truck crane
5. 25-ton Grove
1978
10 years
hydraulic truck crane
Id. at 1465-66.
48. Stated lease terms were revised, the rental rates were reduced, allocation of ex
penses between the parties was adjusted, and options to purchase were eliminated. McNa
mara, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1465-67.
1.

2.
3.
4.
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The Commissioner disallowed the ITC and assessed a deficiency.
D & B argued to the Tax Court that the face of the written lease
should be respected and the ITC allowed. In opposition, the Commis
sioner argued the realistic contemplation test. He countered that there
was a reasonable certainty that the lessor would continue to use the
leased equipment beyond the stated term of the lease and that the
leases were, in fact, of indefinite duration. 49 The Tax Court accepted
the Commissioner's argument and affirmed the disallow~nce of the
ITC.50 D & B appealed the Tax Court decision.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax
Court's decision. The court held that where there are "legitimate eco
nomic and business considerations" and where tax avoidance is not
the primary motive behind the transactions, then short of the Com
missioner showing the lease transaction to be a "sham," a lease docu
ment satisfying the short-term lease test should be respected and the
ITC allowed. 51 Further, the court determined that, based on the writ
ten terms of the lease, D & B retained the active business risks associ
ated with the lease transaction. Such risks included the possibilities
that the value of the equipment might decline, that the lessees might
lose the continued ability to pay, and that the equipment might need
to be re-Ieased. 52
In rejecting the Commissioner's realistic contemplation test, the
Seventh Circuit reviewed the legislative history of Section 46(e)(3)(B)
and, without elaboration, noted that the Commissioner's real concern
appeared to be evasion of taxes through common ownership of parties
to lease transactions. 53 The court determined that Congress enacted
Section 46(e)(3)(B) to prevent use of the ITC as a tax shelter for pas
sive investors. To this end, the short-term lease test "is designed to
ensure that the lessor bears much of the economic risk of the prop
49. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 169-70.
50. Evidence relied upon by the Tax Court included: 1) 0 & B's purchases were
made specifically to meet the needs of Roofing; 2) Roofing's cost by leasing from 0 & B was
less than if a third-party lessor were used; 3) there were no subsequent changes in the
financial situation of Roofing allowing purchase of its own equipment; 4) 0 & B leased only
to related parties; and 5) 0 & B and Roofing were commonly owned. McNamara, 827
F.2d at 171, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1468-69.
51. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172.
52. Id. at 171.
53. Id. at 172 n.5. The court further stated that Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code gives the Commissioner authority to reallocate credits between commonly owned
entities to prevent tax evasion or to clearly reflect income. But, the Commissioner has
never used that power "to reallocate the investment tax credit in cases involving leasing
transactions among related entities." Id.
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erty."54 The court specifically rejected the Commissioner's realistic
contemplation test:
The fact that the lessor and lessee may realistically contemplate
continuous renewal of a lease certainly cannot afford the lessor the
same kind of protection [from economic risk] as a binding commit
ment to renew on identical or essentially similar terms.[55] The
principal economic risk associated with the ownership of rental
property is the risk of a dramatic reduction in expected rental in
come .... To insulate itself from this risk ... a lessor must enter
into a long-term lease which obligates the lessee to pay a fixed
amount of rent over the entire useful life of the property. Short of
such an arrangement, the lessor will continue to bear at least some
risk associated with ownership of the property. 56

Thus, without some guarantee or expectation of renewal on the same
or similar terms, even where the parties are commonly controlled or
may have reasonably contemplated at the inception of the lease trans
actions that the lease would be continuously renewed, the lessor re
tains the· risks of ownership of the property.
Based primarily on its assessment of congressional intent in en
acting Section 46(e)(3)(B)-that emphasis be placed on retention of
business risk where there are legitimate economic and business consid
erations underlying the leasing transactions-the court concluded:
At least in cases involving leasing activity that is not primarily tax
motivated, where the stated lease term in a written lease document
satisfies the 50 percent requirement, that document should be
respected, and unless the Commissioner can demonstrate that the
lease is a "sham," i. e., that there has been a real shifting of all eco
nomic risk associated with the leased property from the lessor to the
lessee, the lessor is entitled to claim an investment tax credit for the
property . . . .57

In further support of its contention that retention of risk be determina
tive of a short-term lease transaction, the court provided that the
54. Id. at 170.
55. Leases containing a binding commitment to renew·on identical or substantially
similar terms or containing options to renew may be aggregated. See Rev. Rul. 76-266,
1976-2 C.B. 10, 11. This revenue ruling governs circumstances in which successive leases
are aggregated and considered as one lease. Leases may be aggregated where either concur
rent agreements to lease for successive periods which extend beyond 50% of the useful life
of the property and/or options to renew are found. However, the rule favors not aggregat
ing leases in which there is real negotiation of the terms of the new leases or retention by
the lessor of some of the economic risk associated with the property. Id.
56. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 171.
57. Id. at 172.
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Commissioner must show the lease to be effectively long-term. "[A]t
minimum there must be a fixed intention that the lease will be continu
ously renewed on the same or substantively identical terms" to prove
the lease transaction is a "sham."58
B.

Connor v. Commissioner 59

In Connor, a case factually similar to McNamara, the First Cir
cuit Court of Appeals followed the majority of the Tax Court deci
sions60 in specifically disagreeing with the McNamara approach and
accepting the Commissioner's argument that the realistic contempla
tion test should be applied. As a result, the court determined that the
lease transaction was, in substance, of indefinite duration and the tax
payer was disallowed the ITC.
In Connor, Sunset Construction Company (Sunset), a partner
ship,61 was formed to buy and lease heavy construction equipment to
two related companies. 62 In 1979 and 1980, one of the partners, Eu
gene R. Connor, claimed an ITC on his personal income tax retum 63
for the Section 38 property purchased for the purpose of leasing. The
58. Id. The court vacated the decision of the Tax Court and remanded for the lim
ited purpose of determining if any of the five leases were "shams" using the test given. On
remand, the Tax Court determined that four of the five leases were not "shams." The fifth
lease was also remanded for the purpose of determining if the 15% test of I.R.C.
§ 46(e)(3)(B) was met. The court determined that the test was not met, obviating the ne
cessity of reaching the issue of a "sham" for this one lease. McNamara v. Commissioner,
55 T.C.M. (CCH) 401 (1988).
59. Connor v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988).
60. See supra note 16.
61. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for an explanation of the effects of the
partnership form of ownership.
62. Ownership of Sunset Construction Company was in the form of a general part
nership owned equally by Eugene R. Connor and his brother, John H. Connor III. The
brothers were each 50% shareholders in the related companies, Connor Construction Cor
poration (Connor Co.) and Catamount Construction Corporation (Catamount). Connor v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 724, 725 (1987). "In 1979, Sunset purchased 19 pieces of
equipment at a total cost of $604,478. In 1980, Sunset purchased additional equipment at a
total cost of $115,022." Id. at 726. The Section 38 property purchased was primarily
heavy construction equipment. Smaller pieces of equipment were generally purchased di
rectly by Connor Co. and Catamount. Id. at 725-26.
63. Eugene R. Connor and his wife, Mary P. Connor, filed joint tax returns for the
years in question. The Investment Tax Credits claimed on the Connors' tax returns are as
follows:
Deficiency
Year
$ 7,669.00
1976
1,013.82
1977
1978
11,872.18
1979
7,147.80
4,781.00
1980
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Commissioner disallowed the lTC, arguing that it was reasonably cer
tain that the leases would last far longer than the stated term resulting
in noncompliance64 with the short-term lease test. 65 The taxpayer
countered, arguing that the terms of the written leases should be
respected. The Tax Court accepted the Commissioner's realistic con
templation argument, determined the leases to be in substance of in
definite duration,66 and affirmed disallowance of the ITC. Connor
appealed the decision of the Tax Court to the First Circuit Court of
Appeals.
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Connor affirmed
the Tax Court decision. The court approached its analysis of the
short-term lease test by first reviewing the decision reached in McNa
mara. The court determined that under the McNamara test 67 the tax
payer would prevail because, as conceded by the Commissioner,
Connor's motives for entering into the leasing transactions were valid
business reasons and not part of a tax avoidance scheme. 68 However,
the court disagreed both with the taxpayer's arguments and with the
McNamara court's interpretation of the short-term lease test. The
court gave four reasons for its disagreement with the McNamara deci
sion: statutory analysis; purpose of the statute; administerability of the
tax code; and deference to the Commissioner's interpretation of the
Id. at 724-25. Only the leases and corresponding tax credits for the years 1979 and 1980
were at issue. These totaled $11,928.80 in value. Id. at 726.
64. The written term of the lease was one year; however, the Commissioner found
that the leases were actually for a longer period exceeding half the useful life of the prop
erty. Connor, 847 F.2d at 986.
65. See supra note 29 for the text of I.R.C. § 46(e)(3)(B).
66. Connor, 847 F.2d at 986.
67. Id. at 987.
68. The Connor brothers formed Sunset for two reasons. First, they wanted to avoid
being cited for unfair labor practices. The Connors' other two companies, Connor Con
struction Corp. and Catamount Construction Corp., were respectively unionized and nonunionized:
The simultaneous operation of a union and a non-union construction com
pany, both of which are under common ownership, is referred to as a "double
breasted" operation. Failure to operate the two companies as separate, distinct
entities can result in a finding ... [of] an unfair labor practice.
Inter-company loans and the rental of equipment back and forth between
Connor Construction and Catamount might have raised questions over whether
the double-breasted operations were separate and distinct.
Connor, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 725. Second, bid bonds are commonly required for contrac
tors doing public construction work. Moving fixed assets to the financial statements of
Sunset correspondingly removed them from the financial statements of the related compa
nies making those companies appear more liquid and improving their ability to acquire bid
bonds. Id.
.
Q
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tax code. 69
In Connor, the court interpreted the McNamara decision as call
ing for a strong presumption in favor of a written lease, as requiring an
examination of the motives of the lessor and lessee on a case-by-case
basis, and as shifting the burden of proof to the Commissioner in con
travention of IRS Rules of Practice and Procedure. 70 The court stated
the McNamara test as follows:
In McNamara, the court interpreted [Section] 46(e)(3)(B) as requir
ing the Commissioner to accept at face value "the stated lease term
in a written lease," at least where (1) the "leasing activity ... is not
primarily tax motivated" and (2) the Commissioner can [not]
demonstrate that the lease is a "sham," i.e., that there has been a
real shifting of all economic risk associated with the leased property
from the lessor to the lessee. 71

The Connor court stated that the language of the statute does not on
its face require a McNamara test or any other test 72 and, moreover,
that "the statute's purposes do not seem to call for the strong 'written
lease' presumption that the [McNamara court] has erected."73
In Connor, the court further viewed McNamara as requiring that
the Commissioner demonstrate the transaction to be a "sham" by di
recting that "the Commissioner or the courts ... examine the motives
of the lessor/purchaser . . . to decide whether, on all the facts, the
lessor/purchaser was a legitimate business ...."74 Connor rejected
this subjective approach in favor of its own interpretation of congres
sional intent, that is, establishment of what the court termed an "ob
69. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987-89. The court focused on evidence showing that the
related companies were likely to receive one of the many jobs that they bid upon where the
leased equipment would be used. The companies were closely related, and Sunset was cre
ated specifically to meet the needs of the lessees. There were no past rentals or sales to
third parties, and the lessees leased from third party lessors only after Sunset's business
decision not to meet the lessee's needs through purchase of the equipment to lease to the
related companies. Id. at 991.
70. Id. at 987-88. IRS Rules of Practice and Procedure are public statements of
internal practices and procedures. S. SURREY, supra note 12, at 21.
71. Connor, at 987 (quoting McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172).
72. In fact, the language of the statute says simply that "the term of the lease (taking
into account options to renew) ... [must be] less than 50 percent of the useful life of the
property." I.R.e. § 46(e)(3)(8) (1988). See supra note 29 for the full text of the statute.
Thus, the Connor court analyzed the statute concluding that the language of the stat
ute does not require any specific test because the words "term" and "offer to renew" are not
specifically defined in the statute. The manner in which these may be shown is left to the
court's interpretation. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987.
73. [d.
74. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987 (citing Ridder v. Commissioner, 76 T.e. 86i,' 872 (1981)
("hard and fast" test adopted by Congress for determining eligibility».
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jective test" based on the length of the lease as determined by the
realistic contemplation test. The court stated that the purpose of the
statute was to. discourage passive investment by "persons not genu
inely in the leasing business, say, partnerships of doctors, or lawyers,
or dentists, to obtain for themselves the benefits of the ITC"75 thereby
sheltering other income from tax. Instead, Congress chose to en
courage real investment by firms in fact in the leasing business.7 6 To
that end, Congress enacted the short-term lease test which the court
determined was designed to focus on the nature of the lease, rather
than on the underlying motives of the lessor or the lessee. 77 In the
court's view, the short-term lease test established objective criteria
based on "lease-life."78
As further support for its contention that Congress did not intend
examination of the motives of the lessor and lessee on a case-by-case
basis, the court pointed out that Congress recognized that there would
be legitimate professional lessors who would not meet the test.7 9 To
accommodate those lessors and to preempt case-by-case analysis, Con
gress "permit[ted] a disqualified lessor ... to pass on the ITC to the
leasing firm, which can then itself use the credit."80
Further, the court held the McNamara test too difficult to admin
ister for two reasons. 8l First, the test requires examination of the les
sor's motives on a case-by-case basis. Second, the test shifts the
burden of proof to the Commissioner if there is a written lease comply
ing on its face with the short-term lease test and no tax avoidance
motive is found. The court stated that "Congress ... [wrote] a general
rule based on the length of the lease, [and did] not ... order case-by
case risk assessment. "82 This general rule is easier to administer be
cause making the written lease determinative of the term of the lease
can allow manipulation 83 by the parties, especially where the parties
are commonly controlled,84 because the lessor controls the amount of
75. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
76. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987.
77. Id. at 988.
78. Id. at 987.
79. Id. at 988.
80. Id. See supra note 36 (I.R.C. § 48(d) (1988) allows the lessor to pass the ITC on
to the lessee).
81. Connor, 847 F.2d at 988..
82. Id.
83. '~If a lessor has complete control of a lessee, the 'risk' it chooses to shift is also
under its control. It can draft either long-term, or short-term, leases to impose risks in a
host of different ways, all without changing their duration." Id"
84. The Connor court is especially concerned here because the subject written leases
were executed after the fact on the advice of an accountant. Id.
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risk that it shifts- to the lessee. 8s
Further, on the issue of administerability, the court stated that
shifting the burden of proof to the Commissioner as provided in the
McNamara test 86 goes against the IRS's procedural rules. Discussing
burden of proof requirements, the court stated:
[A]llowing the Commissioner to prove that a lease is a sham ...
means that, given a lease with the right language, the Commissioner
rather than the taxpayer effectively bears the burden of proof. The
Commissioner must demonstrate that the lease is a sham, presuma
bly by using many of the same factors that the taxpayer previously
had to use to show his or her "realistic contemplation." This result
cuts against the spirit of Rule 142(a).87

Finally, the Connor court gave deference to the Commissioner's
interpretation of the short-term lease test for two reasons. 88 First, the
court recognized the Commissioner's expertise in interpreting the
complex statutory provisions of the tax law. Second, the court stated
that consistent interpretation of a statute is entitled to the court's re
spect. Thus, the Connor court paid deference to the Commissioner's
interpretation of the statute and applied his realistic contemplation
test: "the taxpayer must show that the parties, when they made the
lease, 'realistic[ally] contempl[ated)' that the lease would cover less
than 50 percent of the property's usefullife."89 The court determined
that the Connors' failed to meet this test and that the leases were actu
ally of indefinite duration. Thus, the court disallowed the ITC.

III.

ANALYSIS

The First and Seventh Circuits' approaches to the interpretation
of the short-term lease test are quite different. This section analyzes
these conflicting interpretations, discussing the statutory language and
congressional intent, application of the short-term lease test in those
transactions where the taxpayer has common ownership or control of
the lessor and lessee, and the subjective versus objective nature of the
proffered tests. This section also explores the concept of deference to
the IRS administrative agency and discusses why the court in Connor,
85. [d.
86. [d. (citing McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172).
87. [d. at 988. "Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, 26 U.S.c. foil. § 7453
[(1982)] (taxpayer bears burden of proof in protesting deficiency assessed by Commis
sioner)." [d.
88. [d. at 989.
89. [d. (citing Hokanson v. Commissioner, 730 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984); Rid
der v. Commissioner, 76 T.c. 867, 875 (1981».
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based on accepted standards for deference, was incorrect in deferring
to the Commissioner's interpretation of the short-term lease test. This
section concludes with a discussion of the interpretation of the short
term lease test which best effectuates the intent of Congress.
A.

Comparison of the McNamara and Connor Decisions

The McNamara and Connor decisions agree in two important re
spects. First, both courts agree that the congressional purpose of the
ITC was to discourage passive investors from using the ITC and, con
versely, to encourage active investment by non-corporate lessors.9o
Thus, to benefit from the lTC, Congress required that non-corporate
lessors lease the Section 38 property for less than half of its useful
life. 91 Second, pursuant to the McNamara rationale, the taxpayers in
both cases would be allowed to take the ITC.92
In contrast, the courts' opinions diverge strongly in interpreting
and applying the intent of Congress. The McNamara court inter
preted this purpose as a requirement that the lessor bear the economic
risk of the transaction93 and required the Commissioner to show the
transaction to be a "sham."94 The Connor court interpreted the con
gressional objective as discouragement of passive investment by those
"not genuinely in the leasing business"95 and applied its objective test
based upon the actual length of the lease. 96 The courts further dis
agreed on the importance of common control in applying the short
term lease test and on the degree of deference owed the Commis
sioner's interpretation. 97
The language of a statute is the first place a court should look in
determining whether an interpretation is appropriate. It is a well es
tablished canon of statutory interpretation that where the words of the
statute are clear they should be applied as written. 98 The statute calls
90. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 170; Connor, 847 F.2d at 987.
91. "[T]he term of the lease (taking into account options to renew) ... [must be] less
than 50 percent of the useful life of the property." I.R.C. § 46(e)(3)(B) (1988). See supra
note 29 for the full text of the statute.
92. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172; Connor, 847 F.2d at 987.
93. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
95. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 123-55 and accompanying text for analysis of the issue of defer
ence to an administrative agency (the IRS) when interpreting the short-term lease test.
98. T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETA
TION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 195 (2d ed. 1874)
(quoting the United States Supreme Court in Fisher v. Blight, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 399
(1805): "Where a law is plain and unambiguous ... the legislature should be intended to
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simply for a lease which extends for less than half of the useful life of
the leased property. This is an objective standard which appears to
look only to the lease document. "Congress thus chose reasonably
clear requirements upon which the taxpayer, the [IRS], and the courts
could rely in determining the propriety of a lessor's retention of the
credit.... Although the rule [Section 46(e)(3)(B)] was initially inter
preted by the courts and the [IRS] fairly literally [ ] current interpreta
tions have superimposed sUbjective criteria on it.... "99 Thus, as a
threshold, there must exist a written lease document which complies
with the statute.
The next source in interpreting a statute is the legislative history.
"Congressional meaning is of course ordinarily to be discerned in the
words Congress uses. But when the literal application of the imprecise
words ... Congress employed ... produces ... extraordinary results
. . . we should determine whether this meaning is confirmed in the
legislative history of the section."loo The issue is whether application
of the Commissioner's realistic contemplation test effectuates the con
gresional intent to discourage passive investors from availing them
selves of the ITC. Congress intended that the ITC be limited to real
investment and that there be a real business motive 101 for a lease:
[M]aking the credit available to the lessor is desirable, as a general
rule.... Nevertheless, ... [the committee] is concerned about the
extent to which individuals (singly or as a group in a joint venture)
are able to utilize the tax benefits of leasing transactions . . . as a
means to shelter from tax a substantial part of their other
income. 102

In Connor, the court justified acceptance of the Commissioner's
realistic contemplation test by stating that where entities are com
monly controlled there is greater opportunity for manipulating a
mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for
construction. ").
99. Vitale, Note-Noncorporate Lessors' Retention of the Investment Tax Credit Fol
lowing Recent Judicial Interpretations of Section 46(e)(3)(B), 37 TAX LAW. 187, 190-91
(1984) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter VITALE]. This note focused on early, 1980-1982,
Tax Court decisions concerning I.R.e. § 46(e)(3)(B) from a tax planning perspective. The
author discussed Ridder v. Commissioner, 76 T.e. 867, 872 (1981), where the Tax Court
upheld the lease document and chose not to interfere with the congressional choice of
"hard and fast" tests for retention of the ITC. Id.
100. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 184 (1967).
101. H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1825, 1843-44.
102. Id.

94

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:75

transaction to fit within the strictures of the Code.103 Congress does
not address common control of a lessor and lessee directly in the
wording of the statute, nor indirectly in the congressional history.
However, common control of the lessor and lessee is a factor in the
majority of the Tax Court cases and in the courts of appeals cases
discussed in this comment that litigate the validity of non-corporate
lessors taking an ITC. Both the McNamara and Connor courts dis
cuss the lessor and lessee as commonly controlled entities. The McNa
mara court addresses common control directly stating that, in fact, the
Commissioner's real concern in these cases is the common control
factor. 104
The Commissioner's argument for the realistic contemplation test
was rejected in a recent Tax Court case, Sauey v. Commissioner, lOS
where the Tax Court changed its approach to the short-term lease
test. 106 In Sauey, the taxpayer partnership purchased and leased two
successively owned airplanes to its related corporation. The Commis
sioner sought to aggregate the leases for both airplanes and deny the
ITC of $133,902 taken in 1981. While generally supporting the
McNamara court's approach, the Sauey court reexamined burden of
proof and evidence issues and stated that the taxpayers must bear the
burden of proof as to whether the lease is short-term. This require
ment is met by showing a short-term lease of fixed duration with no
options to renew. The burden of proof then shifts to the
Commissioner. 107
Departing from both the Connor and McNamara approaches, the
court in Sauey stated that the Commissioner may meet the burden of
proof by arguing reasonable certainty and producing further evidence
that the leases were of indefinite duration. 108 The additional evidence
required included, for example, automatic renewal of leases on the
same terms with no negotiation, purchase and resale of leased equip
ment to satisfy the needs of the related party, and evidence that the
transaction was formed primarily for tax purposes. 109 The Sauey
court concluded by stating:
[The Commissioner's] real concern in this case appears to be that
103. Connor; 847 F.2d at 988.
104. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172 n.5.
105. 90 T.C. 824 (1988). Accord Borchers v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1469
(1988) (but noting the Connor court's disagreement).
106. Sauey, 90 T.C. at 827-28.
107. Id. at 827.
108. Id. at 829-30.
109. Id. at 828-30:
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. . . [the lessor and lessee] are related parties. We recognize that in
leasing transactions involving related parties there is a clear poten
tial for abuse. However, Congress did not see fit to deny the invest
ment credit to noncorporate lessors who are related to their lessees,
even though it easily could have done so . . . . Rather, Congress
simply imposed two hard-and-fast tests ... [the two-prong test of
Section 46(e)(3)(B)], and provided that all noncorporate lessors of
property eligible for the investment credit are entitled to the credit if
they satisfy these two tests. I 10

The Commissioner closely scrutinized common control of the les
sor and the lessee or related party transactions for compliance with the
short-term lease test. I II There is an implied aura of suspicion that by
employing· related business entities, a taxpayer is actually employing
tax evasion techniques. This premise ignores the fact that tax law does
not preclude formation of a business with awareness of the tax
structure. 112
If, as stated in both McNamara and Sauey, the Commissioner's
real concern in these cases is common control of the lessor and the
lessee, it follows that acceptance of the Commissioner's realistic con
templation test in Connor may be justified as a means of preventing
these entities from improperly manipulating the short-term lease test
because the realistic contemplation test can be applied broadly to dis
allow all such related party transactions. Thus, in effect, the Commis
sioner is targeting these entities for using the ITC as a conduit to
shelter other income from tax, clearly a forbidden use of the ITC ac- .
cording to congressional intent. The problem with using the short
term lease test in this manner is that Congress did not intend to forbid
the ITC to these lessors.1I3 Congress had the ability to limit use of the
110. ld. at 829.
III. Close scrutiny takes the form of court review of a number of variables to assess
whether the transaction has the components of arms length dealing. For example, in Con
nor, the court looked for leasing transactions conducted with outside or third parties by the
lessor, the lessee seeking alternative leasing arrangements, lessor purchase of equipment
specifically for the needs of the lessee and resale of equipment motivated solely by the needs
of the lessee. Connor, 847 F.2d at 990.
112. Sauey, 90 T.C. at 829. "To be sure, we have no doubt that ... [Sauey] was
aware of the tax consequences of his leasing activities. However, we have never held that
persons engaged in business activities must be ignorant of the tax benefits resulting from
those activities in order to be eligible for such benefits." ld. See generally Dosart, Tax
court raises section 46(e)(3) hurdle for non-corporate lessors attempting to claim lTC, 58 J.
TAX'N 100 (1983) (observing in a factually similar case, Peterson v. Commissioner, 44
T.C.M. (CCH) 674 (1982), see supra note 16: "[t]he fact pattern here suggests too strongly
a tax savings motivation . . . . The Tax Court seems to overlook the fact that all good
business deals involve a perceived benefit by both parties to the deal.") ld. at 102.
113. Sauey, 90 T.C. at 829.
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ITC to leasing transactions between independently controlled non-cor
porate entities. In fact, Congress chose not to do so.
As further evidence that Congress did not intend that the short
term lease test be used, beyond its scope, as a weapon against tax shel
ters formed by commonly controlled entities, Congress has enacted
statutes which specifically address the issue of abusive tax shelters.'14
These are the tools which Congress has provided to the Commissioner
to disallow such shelters. For example, I.R.C. Section 482 "authorizes
the. Commissioner to reallocate credits between '... businesses .. '.
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests' if nec
essary to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect income." 115
In addition, the tests created by both Connor and McNamara re
quire imposition of a sUbjective case-by-case analysis of the facts. In
McNamara, the court formulates its own test which first accepts the
lease on its face, but then emphasizes a determination, with the Com
missioner bearing the burden of proof, as to whether the lessor is actu
ally in the business of leasing. This is ascertained by analyzing
whether the lessor has retained the economic risk associated with the
transaction. 116 The Connor court terms the McNamara approach sub
jective because it requires review of the lessor's motives in each case.
The Connor court finds particular fault, from both a deference and
administrative convenience point of view,_ with the McNamara re
quirement that the burden of proof shift to the Commissioner once
economic risk is established." 7 Further, the Connor court finds no
specific test embodied in the statute, and so, in deference to the Com
missioner, opts for his interpretation which is the realistic contempla
tion test. liB The Commissioner's realistic contemplation test requires
that "the taxpayer ... show that the parties, when they made the
lease, 'realistic[ally] contempl[ated]' that the lease would cover less
than 50 percent of the property's useful life." 119
Although on a superficial level the realistic contemplation test ap
pears to be objective, it is defective because in application, the test as
used in Connor requires a case-by-case analysis, as does the McNa
mara court's motive analysis test. For that reason, Connor does not
provide an administratively easier solution. Examining either contem
plation by the taxpayer or his motives involves determining what the
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

I.R.C. § 482 (1988). See also McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172 n.5.
I.R.C. § 482 (1988).
McNamara, 827 F.2d at 171-72.
Connor, 847 F.2d at 988-89.
Id. at 989. See supra notes 73-78, 88-89 and accompanying text.
Connor, 847 F.2d at 989.
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taxpayer was considering when making the lease; a far departure from
the clear wording of the statute or the intent of Congress. Contempla
tion is defined as "an act of the mind in considering with attention ...
the act of intending or considering a future event."120 A motive is
"the consideration or object influencing a choice or prompting an ac
tion."121 Examining the leasing transaction after the fact is sUbjective
because the same evidence is used by the Commissioner to prove non
compliance with the short-term lease as by the taxpayer to show com
pliance. The evidence is subjective because, as mustered by the IRS, it
may be molded to fit the test. Indeed, it would be difficult for the
honest taxpayer, who intended and created a short-term lease, to rebut
the government's conclusory evidence that the parties realistically
contemplated a long-term arrangement when that lease, by circum
stance alone, became long-term.
In sum, Congress provided a clearly worded objective two-part
test for determining a valid lease. Although the McNamara test comes
close to effectuating congressional intent because the court first ac
cepts the written lease and then the Commissioner must prove the
transaction is a "sham," the further requirement that each leasing
transaction be examined for the appropriate retention of economic risk
by the lessor goes beyond the scope of the statute. The difficulty lies in
fashioning a test which allows the honest noncorporate lessor to take
advantage of the ITC as Congress provided. The approach taken by
the Sauey court best reflects the intent of Congress and strikes a work
able balance between Connor and McNamara. In Sauey, the court di
rects that all non-corporate lessors are eligible for the ITC if the
transaction satisfies the two-pronged test of the statute, but requires
further evidence to show the lease is a legitimate business transac
tion. 122 This means that in a case where a short-term lease, by busi
ness circumstance alone, becomes long-term, the taxpayer is given an
opportunity to rebut the Commissioner's conclusory evidence that a
long-term arrangement was intended from the inception of the lease.
The realistic contemplation test, even if used to prevent. shelter of
other income by commonly controlled entities, should be rejected as
an overly broad application of the statute that reaches beyond the
scope of the statute and its congressional history. The Connor court
also posited that deference is due to the Commissioner's interpretation
of the short-term lease test. As discussed in the following section, this
120.
121.
122.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 491 (3d ed. 1976).
Id. at 1475.
See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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rationale for sustaining the Commissioner's realistic contemplation
test is unwarranted.

B.

The Deference Issue: Concepts and Cases

This section explores the issue of deference to the Commissioner's
interpretation of the short-term lease test by describing the rationale
for deference to administrative agencies and by analyzing the pertinent
case law on judicial deference to the Commissioner's interpretation of
the Internal Revenue Code. The Commissioner's interpretation of the
short-term lease test, calculated to disallow the lTC, has varied over
time. Cases illustrating these varied interpretations are presented.
There are several criteria to which the courts look in determining
the degree of deference to accord an agency interpretation of a statute.
These include: the congressional intent as to the discretion to be af
forded that agency; the superior knowledge or degree of expertise in
the agency; and the limits on the court's power to effectuate policy
decisions because those decisions are ultimately within the agency's
jurisdiction. 123 The Commissioner has traditionally been afforded a
great degree of deference from the judiciary because of the complexity
of the Internal Revenue Code and the expertise and understanding of
the code as a whole needed for proper interpretation of the various
sections. 124
In Bob Jones University v. United States,125 the United States
Supreme Court recognized the broad power vested by Congress in the
Commissioner to administer and interpret the tax laws. 126 The Court
stated, "Ever since the inception of the Tax Code, Congress has seen
fit to vest in those administering the tax laws very broad authority to
interpret those laws .... [C]ongress expressly authorized the Commis
sioner 'to make all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement'
of the tax laws." 127 Applying this principle, the Court in Jewett v.
Commissioner 128 deferred to the Commissioner's viewpoint when the
123. R. PIERCE, JR., S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUlL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRO
CESS, § 7.1, at 351-52 (1985) [hereinafter R. PIERCE, JR.].
124. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 224 (1984); Bob Jones Univer
sity v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596-97 (1983); Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305,
318 (1982).
125. 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (United States Supreme Court found Commissioner's de
nial of tax-exempt status to a private school, based on that school's practice of racial dis
crimination, to be a policy determination within the Commissioner's power).
126. Id. at 596-97.
127. Id. at 596.
128. 455 U.S. 305 (1982) (determination of the meaning of "transfer" as applied to
testamentary transfers for federal gift tax purposes).
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positions of both the taxpayer and the Commissioner found support in
the code.
The purpose of judicial review of agency action is to confine such
action within the boundaries or limits set by Congress in the pertinent
legislation. I29 Thus, as a threshold, the agency's action must be con
sistent with the policies of the legislature for the courts to find in favor
of the agency.130 In addition to statutory interpretation that is consis
tent with the intent of Congress, consistency refers to agency uniform
ity in interpretation of a statute. By reqUlnng consistent
interpretations, the courts ensure that the public is provided notice as
to permissible conduct concerning matters within the agency's juris
diction. Thus, "[r]eviewing courts ... search for (1) internal consis
tency and rationality in the agency's reasoning process; (2)
interdecisional consistency ... similar cases being resolved in a similar
manner; and, (3) intertemporal consistency ... the agency applying
the same decisional standards over time." 13 I The rationality concept
also focuses on the Commissioner's application of the statute and re
quires that the agency decision be nondiscriminatory. The agency
must consider all relevant factors prior to making its decision and
avoid "making its decisions in a discriminatory manner based on the
personal . . . characteristics of the parties affected by the agency's
action." 132
In Jewett, the Court afforded respect to the Commissioner's inter
pretation of the tax code because this interpretation was consistent
over a fifty year period. 133 By contrast, in Commissioner v. Engle, 134
the Court refused to defer to the Commissioner's interpretation of the
tax code.135 While recognizing that the Commissioner is generally af
129. R. PIERCE, JR., supra note 123, § 5.1.4, at 124.
130. [d. § 7.1, at 350 ("[a]n agency's action is consistent with the policy decisions of
Congress only if the agency's action is based on an accurate determination of legislative
intent and an accurate determination of the factual predicates for the agency's action"). [d.
131. [d. § 5.1.5, at 127.
132. [d. § 7.1, at 353.
133. Jewett, 455 U.S. at 311-12, 318. "Both positions find support in the language'of
the Regulation." [d. at 311. "Because that text is not entirely clear, however, it is appro
priate to examine briefly the Regulation's history." [d. at 312. "The Commissioner's inter
pretation of the Regulation has been consistent over the years and is entitled to respect."
[d. at 318.
134. 464 U.S. 206 (1984) (taxpayers challenged the Commissioner'S interpretation
which disallowed depletion allowances for oil and gas reserves).
135. In addition to arguing for deference, the Commissioner argued that his interpre
tation provided greater administrative convenience. The Court dismissed the Commis
sioner's administrative convenience argument stating, "[e]liminating the allowance [for
depletion of gas and oil reserves] might make the statute 'simpler to administer,' ... but it
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forded a high degree of deference, the Court applied a standard of
reasonableness to the Commissioner's interpretation. Using the stan
dard of reasonableness as measured against the congressional history
of the statute,136 the Court found the Commissioner's interpretation
unreasonable and inconsistent with congressional intent.
When interpreting the short-term lease test, the Commissioner in
vokes a variety of conflicting tests to disallow the ITC and alters his
arguments according to the facts of the case. The Commissioner's his
tory of inconsistent interpretation of the statute calls into question the
propriety of judicial deference to the Commissioner's interpretations.
Additionally, the Commissioner has suggested another test, the "trade
or business" test,137 which the Tax Court rejected.
Stewart IV v. U.S.A. 138 presented an issue analogous to the short
term lease test. To qualify for an lTC, the lessor was required to prove
that its leases to a governmental body, the Post Office, were short
term. 139 The leases as written were short-term, but allowed for auto
. matic renewal unless cancelled. 140 Taking an approach similar to that
in the Connor case, the Commissioner argued that the actual length of
the rental rather than the term of the lease should control. 141 The
taxpayer argued that the district court should enforce the six month
legal minimum term of the lease, making it a short-term lease, because
there· was no assurance that the lease would extend beyond that pe
riod. 142 The district court held for the Commissioner stating that "the
controlling question is the duration of the actual use rather than the
does so by ignoring the language of the statute, the views of those who sought its enact
ment, and the purpose they articulated." Id. at 227.
136. Id. at 220, 224. "[T]he true meaning of a single section of a statute in a setting
as complex as that of the revenue acts, however precise its language, cannot be ascertained
if it be considered apart from related sections, or if the mind be isolated from the history of
the income tax legislation of which it is an integral part." Id. at 223 (quoting Helvering v.
Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934».
137. Miller v. Commissioner, 85 T.e. 1064 (1985). See infra notes 148-52 and ac
companying text.
138. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9648 (D. Neb. 1977).
139. I.R.C. § 48(a)(5) (1954).
140. The terms of the lease were:
The term of all contracts extended from the date of delivery to the end of the
fiscal year. The contracts were automatically renewable for up to three fiscal
years unless sooner cancelled. Either party to the contract had the option to
cancel the contract after six months by giving thirty days' written notice. During
any renewal period following the end of the fiscal year in which the contract was
negotiated, either party could cancel on one day's notice.
Stewart IV, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9648 at 88,176.
141. . ld. at 88,177.
142. Id. at 88,175-76.
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term of any single lease, since the leases were subject to automatic
renewal unless the parties took affirmative action."143
In Hoisington v. Commissioner,l44 the lessor partnership was cre
ated to purchase and lease to drivers refrigerated freight trucks then
owned by a related corporation to encourage driver ownership of the
vehicles. The lessees invoked early cancellation clauses in accordance
with the terms of their long-term leases. 145 As a result, the actual du
ration of the leases was short-term. The taxpayers claimed that under
these facts; their property should qualify for the ITC. In Hoisington,
the Commissioner abandoned the realistic contemplation test ad
vanced in Connor, instead arguing that the ITC should be disallowed
on the basis of the terms stated within the written lease. The taxpay
ers argued that the substance of the transaction should be determina
tive of compliance with the short-term lease test.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
Commissioner's argument that the term fixed within the long-term
lease should be determinative,146 stating that "[s]ubstance over form is
a doctrine which should be resorted to sparingly. It is not a wholesale
license to dismantle and reform transactions by hindsight to achieve a
certain tax result. In general, bona fide contracts ought to be
respected." 147
In Miller v. Commissioner,148 to disallow the lTC, the Commis
143. Id. at 88,177.
144. 833 F.2d 1398 (10th Cir. 1987). Graves Trucklines, Inc. (GTI) created a part
nership, Power Leasing Associates (PLA), to effectuate the purchase and lease of refriger
ated trucks to driver-employees ofGTI. PLA was the lessor and the driver-employees were
the lessees. The lessee and lessor were not commonly controlled; however, the degree to
which this transaction was at arms-length is debatable. Id. at 1399-1402.
145. The leases allowed early cancellation so that drivers, not opting to own their
vehicles after a trial period, could retain their status as members of the Teamsters Union.
Id. at 1401. "Cancellation of the leases was permitted on thirty days notice, and fourteen
of the leases cancelled within ... [the strictures of the short-term lease test]." Id. at 1399.
146. Id. at 1405-06. "[N]o court has yet held that the ... [reasonable contemplation]
test is appropriate for reducing the fixed term of a lease.... [W]e reject the argument that
the taxpayers' reasonable contemplation of early cancellation overrides the actual agree
ment as to the fixed lease term. Just as in substance versus form, the written agreement of
the parties also expresses their contemplation with respect to the lease...." Id. at 1406.
147. Id. at 1405. The court elaborated stating:
Further, the doctrine is not the exclusive province of the government. However,
the problem with the taxpayers' invocation of substance over form is that they are
faced with the dilemma of repUdiating their own transaction expressed in terms of
their own choosing. Especially in circumstances where the agreement is adverse
to the interest of the drafter, the original written version is the substance, and the
drafter is essentially estopped from denying that point.
Id.
148. 85 T.e. 1064 (1985) (partnership obtained recourse financing from an unrelated
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sioner proposed that, in addition to the two-pronged test of Section
46(e)(3)(B), 149 which included the short-term lease test, the Tax Court
should apply a trade or business test. That test required that "the
noncorporate lessor independently ... establish that he was engaged in
the trade or business of leasing and that the particular lease in ques
tion was a part of that trade or business."150 The Commissioner ar
gued that this test would ensure compliance with the specific
legislative intent of the short-term lease test because the ITC would be
denied where leasing transactions were used as devices to shelter other
income from tax.15I The Tax Court held against the Commissioner,
allowed the lTC, and held that the statute required and Congress in
tended only compliance with the two-pronged test. 152
Thus, the Commissioner has invoked a variety of interpretations
of the short-term lease test to disallow the ITC. As stated in Hois
ington,153 "the government has been on all sides of the issue [of which
test applies], depending on the advantage to be gained."ls4 This lack
of uniformity in interpreting the code supports the McNamara court's
decision not to defer to the Commissioner. The Connor court improp
erly deferred to the Commissioner because deference to an administra
tive agency's interpretation is not warranted when that interpretation
has not been uniform over time. ISS
The Connor decision fails first because acceptance of the Commis
sioner's realistic contemplation test contravenes the intent of Con
gress. Second, the decision fails because judicial deference to the
Commissioner's interpretation is improper. The McNamara test more
closely parallels congressional intent because the court initially accepts
the written lease. But then McNamara goes too far and applies its
party to purchase Section 38 property, a crane costing $451,225.00, for lease to its related
corporation. Use of the ITC generated deficiencies of $90,496.(0). Id. at 1065-66. See
contra Niagara County Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 51 (1984) (ITC
denied where lease of Section 38 property by partnership to related corporation found to be
a financing device only. The Tax Court found that there was no good faith business pur
pose for the lease and no evidence that the partnership performed business functions other
than holding title.)._
149. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
ISO. Miller, 85 T.C. at 1070.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1073-75. The Tax Court also held that even if the Commissioner's argu
ment for a trade or business test was valid, this partnership was in the business of leasing
and not merely established as a financing device. Id.
153. 833 F.2d 1398 (10th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
154. Id. at 1406.
155. R. PIERCE, JR., supra note 123, § 5.1.5, at 127. See supra note 117 and accom
panying text.

1990]

SHORT-TERM LEASE TEST OF l.R.C SECTION 46(e)(3)(B)

103

own sUbjective standard, an evaluation of risk retained by the lessor,
that is beyond congressional intent. The Sauey decision 156 returns the
court to the basic purpose of the statute and enforces within reason
able bounds the ability of the commonly controlled non-corporate les
sor to take an ITC. Based upon principles of statutory analysis,
congressional intent, and judicial deference, the Sauey decision is
correct.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The result of the foregoing is uncertainty for the taxpayer in his
business and tax planning and for the Commissioner in determining
when the ITC should be disallowed. Congress provided that the ITC
be used for actual investment in business property and so made it
available to non-corporate lessors under very particular circumstances
including the strictures of the short-term lease test. The short-term
lease test supplies a clearly defined standard: the lease must be less
than half the useful life of the property. Despite this, the courts have
struggled to reconcile the written lease, the substance of the transac
tion, and a suspicion of the business practices of commonly controlled
entities. The court's approach to setting a standard has been fraught
with confusion. A court applying the Commissioner's realistic con
templation test to a short-term lease which has been continuously re
newed will judge the lease to be of indefinite duration at conception.
The test does not address the possibility that the parties actually in
tended to create a short-term lease.
Additionally, in light of the variety of approaches taken by the
Commissioner, the fairness and legitimacy of a court deferring to the
Commisioner's interpretation of the short-term lease test is questiona
ble. The Commissioner's tests are tailored to disallow the ITC rather
than to interpret the statute fairly. The Commissioner has exceeded
his limits of discretion. A taxpayer should not be forced into litigation
simply because of the Commissioner's suspicion of common control
when Congress has not forbidden the benefits of the ITC to such par
ties. Simple adherence to the statutory scheme would allow the tax
payer the requisite certainty in his business and tax planning.
Gail M Corbett

\ 56.

See supra notes 105-\ 5 and accompanying text.

